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How important are fisheries to the most important strategic risks for the United States? 
Can a broader thinking about what should constitute food security allow the US to invest 
strategically in aquaculture while enhancing its position in geostrategic competition with 
China? I find in this study that the US does have opportunities to help some other 
strategically important countries address shortfalls they might experience if wild-capture 
fisheries were to collapse. That can help their food security and the US’ national security 
simultaneously by helping keep countries stable. But I also find that the US is 
significantly lagging behind China’s global aquaculture leadership, and that US actions to 
catch up would need drastic levels of infrastructure funding. I identify that the Chinese 
aquaculture industry is so far advanced relative to other countries that they would control 
nearly half of the world market for fish by 2035 should capture fisheries collapse. I also 
find that numerous countries of strategic importance to either the US, China, or to both, 
are very reliant on fisheries compared with the global average. The research identifies 
that an absence of strategic action by the US will ensure that China’s aquaculture 
advantage will allow it to be the key global provider of a critical resource demanded by 
many countries of interest to the two countries, granting Beijing extreme leverage in food 
security over those countries and an improvement in the security competition with the 
US. 
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This research asks about America’s food security efforts, and whether or not 
America’s current approach to food security policy is in line with its most important 
security interests. If not, could a new framework for strategically understanding and 
acting on fisheries as a security threat and opportunity better help the US address its 
biggest security challenges, particularly in competition with China? 
The definition of food security is problematic for US strategic interests, because it 
is a vague term, but generally narrowly used. As a result, resource competition and 
challenges - and especially those with food - are often not considered as highly as other 
“hard” security risks. 
The US government currently has a Global Food Security Strategy (GFSS) based 
on a law passed by Congress. But it is a narrow focus on development work, while other 
government reports surveying key parts of the government have identified the biggest 
long-term risks to US security. The US government identified twenty-six external 
security risks, many of which food does or could play a role.1 But the current 
expenditures under the GFSS only directly do work in two of those areas, by supporting 
foreign government stability and countering terrorism. New approaches to government 
food policies cannot solve all security problems, but they might prevent current 
challenges from becoming harder to overcome.  
I attempted with this research to answer two fundamental questions: First, how 
well does the current US approach to food security programs through its Feed the Future 
 
1 U.S. Government Accountability Office. “Long-Range Emerging Threats Facing the United States As 
Identified by Federal Agencies” GAO-19-204SP: Published: Dec 13, 2018. 
https://www.gao.gov/assets/700/695981.pdf. See Appendix C. 
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and foreign aid align with the biggest US security challenges - namely, in the most 
important countries where improvements in or protection of food access could play a role 
in improving US security outcomes?  
Second, the paper looks more deeply at fish - a unique area of food security 
because of the international interest in (and need for) utilizing declining fish stocks in 
international waters, and also the potential substitutability of those wild fisheries with 
fish farming operations - should sufficient investment be available. This is a unique area 
that should be of particular interest to China, the US, and the billions of others worldwide 
who rely on the ocean for food. This research asks: Can the US use strategic investments 
in aquaculture to address the security impacts of a potential future collapse of global 
wild-capture fisheries?2 Specifically, this paper evaluates four frameworks for the US to 
manage risks and opportunities with fisheries and aquaculture - especially with regard to 
the US-China competition. 
This research focuses on the potential for using advanced aquaculture systems on 
land. These recirculating aquaculture systems (RAS) require the construction of 
buildings, large tanks, and water filtration recycling systems, and thus require more 
capital to construct than simple cage farms located in ponds, rivers, or the ocean. But they 
can grow fish with less disease susceptibility than in nets cages in open waters; cyclical 
 
2 Edwards, Peter and Demaine, Harvey. “Rural Aquaculture: Overview and Framework for Country 
Reviews.” For Regional Office for Asia and the Pacific, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United 
Nations. 1998. Accessed May 8, 2021. http://www.fao.org/3/x6941e/x6941e00.htm#contents.  
The authors write: “FAO in 1988 introduced a definition of aquaculture which reduces its confusion with 
capture fisheries: Aquaculture is the farming of aquatic organisms, including fish, molluscs, crustaceans 
and aquatic plants. Farming implies some form of intervention in the rearing process to enhance 
production, such as regular stocking, feeding, protection from predators, etc. Farming also implies 
individual or corporate ownership of the stock being cultivated. For statistical purposes, aquatic organisms 
which are harvested by an individual or corporate body which has owned them throughout their rearing 
period contribute to aquaculture, while aquatic organisms which are exploitable by the public as a 
common property resources, with or without appropriate licences, are the harvest of fisheries.” 
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disease outbreaks are a major risk for traditional approaches to global aquaculture 
growth.3 RAS generally have little to no impact on the surrounding environment.  
I find in this study that the US does have opportunities to selectively help some 
strategically important countries address shortfalls they might experience if capture 
fisheries were to collapse. That can help their food security and the US’ national security 
simultaneously by helping keep countries stable. But I also find that the US is 
significantly lagging behind China’s global aquaculture leadership, and that US actions to 
catch up would need drastic levels of infrastructure funding to be of consequence. 
II. Background - Definitions and Applications of the Concept of Food Security 
I need to first discuss what food security is before considering the ways in which 
the US may want to consider it differently. This section begins with a general review of 
the concepts of food security, discussing how users define the term differently and the 
functional areas of food policy. Then it moves into a discussion of food security in US 
policy, and what this paper intends to test as a new framework. 
Policymakers and scholars approach food security from a few different angles. 
Food security as a term means different things to people and countries depending on the 
context and viewpoint of the user. Food is essential to all people, so some definitions 
think of food security simply as having adequate access to a certain quantity of food. 
Some definitions build on this but go further to describe having high quality and 
nutritious food. These definitions focusing on the individual may be used in domestic 
 
3 Schoonover, R. C. Cavallo, C. I. Caltabiano, I. “The Security Threat That Binds Us: The Unraveling of 
Ecological and Natural Security and What the United States Can Do About It." Edited by F. Femia and A. 
Rezzonico. The Converging Risks Lab, an institute of The Council on Strategic Risks. Washington, DC. 
February 2021. Page 65. 
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policy discussion in the US or more commonly in the west when thinking of international 
development efforts. 
Others look at food security as a systems approach, ensuring the system that 
enables people and countries to have such adequate access to food for individuals is 
protected. This may mean ensuring that food is protected while growing from various 
risks to agriculture, from weather to terrorism; during processing to ensure it is handled 
safely, or to ensure supply chains function properly despite shocks.4  
The last set of definitions looks at food security as a part of national security. This 
may be as a trade tool in cooperation with other states, or in competing with other states 
over access to limited resources, or in some other usage. So although the definitions of 
food security vary, what is most important is to ensure that however an individual or state 
defines it, that one is fully assessing the situation in which you need the food security to 
exist.  
A. Roles of Food in Security 
These definitional differences lead to several different schools of thought about 
security and food. Food, and the security aspects related to food, have existed for 
millennia. Food is a tool to enable improving situations; but it can be a part of conflict in 
various ways. It is critical and can drive behavior, so we think of food as a resource to be 
managed or protected. Sometimes that means securing the food system to deliver food 
where it is needed, and sometimes it is about protecting ecosystems. All of these different 
angles thinking of food leads to a last grouping missing in the US policy sphere: that 
 
4 Wilson Center. “Food Systems and National Security: The Science in Strategy”. Event. May 23, 2019. 




strategic planning around food - or the lack of a strategy - can have important 
consequences for national security.  
1. Access to food secures life - for the individual and the state 
One school of thought looks at food security as protecting life. For the individual, 
securing food is the first priority. Only once one has access to food can they consider 
other activities in life. The UN’s report on global food security and nutrition states that 
“in 2019, close to 750 million – or nearly one in ten people in the world – were exposed 
to severe levels of food insecurity”.5  
Countries may also look at ensuring adequate food as a critical means to protect 
its own stability. A state can maintain power by maintaining access to food, especially 
when it is in short supply. Some actors may gain power by providing food to those who 
cannot access it; those actors can be a threat to state legitimacy. 
Most countries looking at this level of security, of simply providing enough, are 
usually measuring their level of food by calories. Fulbrook, writing on the people of 
Laos, says that “Their health and vitality and consequently that of society are inseparable 
from robust food security. Poor or widespread food insecurity, as is the case with Laos, 
makes for people who are weak and if they are weak then so is their society upon which 
rests national security that the state bears responsibility to ensure. The state then is failing 
in its duty to provide basic national security.”6  
 
5 Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations et al. “The State of Food Security and Nutrition 
in the World 2020: Transforming Food Systems for Affordable Healthy Diets.” 2020. Accessed May 8, 
2021. http://www.fao.org/3/ca9692en/ca9692en.pdf. Page xvi. 
6 Fulbrook, David. “Food as Security.” Food Security, no. 2 (March, 2010): 5-20.  
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For some states, simply providing enough food is as far as food and its national 
security efforts are intertwined. But some states are endowed with different geography 
and natural resources, and some can produce significantly more food than others. They 
may look at food and security from a different lens, because food can be an opportunity 
for them to improve their position in the world. 
2. Food security as an enabler 
A second thought process is food as an enabler. This comes in multiple forms. 
First, improving the efficiency of agricultural production in a less developed country 
enables individuals to grow more food with less work.7 International development 
organizations like the World Bank focus on the special role of agricultural growth in 
development because it is “two to four times more effective at reducing poverty than 
growth originating from other sectors.”8. More agricultural efficiency leads to more 
market opportunities, frees labor, and increases income, often first for the rural, nonfarm 
economies in the developing world that provide 35-50 percent of all rural income.9 That 
process ideally continues to becomes a cycle of economic advancement for the nation as 
a whole as the country undergoes a structural transformation from an economy based on 
agricultural employment to a more advanced industrial or service economy where most 
people do not participate in agriculture.10  
 
7 Townsend, Robert, et al. “Ending Poverty and Hunger by 2030: An Agenda for the Global Food System.” 
World Bank Group. 2015. http://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/700061468334490682/pdf/95768-
REVISED-WP-PUBLIC-Box391467B-Ending-Poverty-and-Hunger-by-2030-FINAL.pdf 
Page 9. 
8 Ibid, 7.  
9 Haggblade, Steven, Hazell, Peter, B.R., and Reardon, Thomas. “Strategies for Stimulating Equitable 
Growth in the Rural Nonfarm Economy.” In “Transforming the Rural Nonfarm Economy”, ed. Haggblade, 
Hazell, and Reardon. International Food Policy Research Institute. The Johns Hopkins University Press. 
2007. Page 396.  




Food security can also be an enabler for some developed countries with already 
advanced agricultural systems. Those with excess production or production expertise in a 
good may trade to gain something advantageous for the country. But this strength can 
become a vulnerability too, if countries or sectors of a country depend on a certain level 
of income from food trade, and it is disrupted – agricultural producing groups generally 
carry outsized political weight.11 China was able to apply tactical pressure the last several 
years in trade negotiations with the United States by hurting America’s farm exports, a 
constituency critical to the US president’s support. Generally, global food and 
agricultural policy is heavily driven by protectionist measures that distort prices and 
markets by countries fearing the loss of access to critical food supplies or interested in 
supporting agricultural constituencies.12 
3. Food and nutrition as a tool 
Excess production capacity can also be used to deliver humanitarian aid, as we 
will see later. Food security is sometimes considered as simply about providing enough 
calories. But the World Bank highlights the importance of nutrition to reduce stunting 
and wasting in children and improve productivity generally.13 Improving nutrition for 
mothers and children is especially powerful for development outcomes.14 US 
development approaches are very much interested in these endeavors, because delivering 
nutrition can be a tool for policy makers in some situations where it is desired but not 
currently present.  
 
11 Ibid, 6. 
12 Ibid, 4. 
13 Townsend, Robert, et al. Pages 9-10. 
14 Ibid, 10. 
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But this can also apply in the US, domestically. In US policy discussions rural 
areas generally support policies that increase benefits for farmers. Non-agricultural areas 
generally think of food policies as critical to improving the health and nutrition of food 
and decreasing prices for consumers.15 The most efficient crops that are the cheapest to 
mechanize and produce in abundance are not always the most nutritious, or the most 
profitable, or even grown for humans to eat. The food that would be most nutritious to 
help populations to improve health is not what many agricultural communities specialize 
in.  
Nutrition is not only an urban weakness. Plenty of rural areas are poor and suffer 
from poor nutrition and are not major agricultural producing areas, like deserts and 
mountainous regions. Delivering nutrition here or to any areas where food and nutrition is 
poor can be a tool for domestic influence.  
4. Food as part of conflict 
The Council on Strategic Risks’ 2021 report explains that “(s)ecuring food 
resources has long been an important issue for national security. Food insecurity can be a 
factor in conflict, instability, social unrest, and migration.”16 Food insecurity due to food 
prices can cause destabilization of governments like in the Arab Spring, and conflicts can 
occur over access to food resources like fisheries within or between states. Food 
insecurity can also result from conflict, due to disrupted production or supply chains as a 
result of the conflict, or intentionally, as a weapon of war.  
 
15 Paarlberg, Robert. “Food Politics: What Everyone Needs to Know.” Oxford University Press. 2010. Page 
6. 
16 Schoonover, R. C. Cavallo, C. I. Caltabiano, I. Page 9. 
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But food need not be a part of active conflict to be a resource in national security 
competitions. China and other countries are making forward looking investments into 
acquiring overseas arable farmland, since farmland globally is limited but populations 
continue to grow. Gassert and Scott assert that while China and the US are engaged in a 
struggle over resources - including agricultural production - China has a better 
coordinated strategy and implementation plan. The US has better natural capability to 
produce food - a resource both major powers need - but less strategic vision to make the 
production match national security interests.17  
5. Threats to food: a resource risk to be managed 
Gassert’s and Scott’s assessment was extensive, but it did not evaluate fisheries. 
Fish are a complicated resource to examine. They move freely, are often found in 
international waters, and face pressures on their resilience from both clearly identifiable 
nation state actors and hard to pinpoint threats, like pollution and ocean acidification. 
Protecting the benefits from fisheries is an example of looking at food security as 
a resource risk that must be managed. This is generally a concern of nation states and 
international and non-profit organizations. The previous sections discussed the 
importance of food to individuals and the state, and looked at how states may use food to 
their advantage. This section looks at protecting food resources, and the threats that occur 
if they are not managed well. 
 
17 Gassert, Francis and Scott, Wyatt. “Great Power Resource Competition in a Changing Climate”. New 





The US intelligence community provides annually an assessment of threats to the 
US. The 2019 Worldwide Threat Assessment discusses food and water security being at 
risk from ecological and environmental degradation, including climate change. The 
assessment states that extreme weather changes “combined with poor governance 
practices—are increasing water and food insecurity around the world, increasing the risk 
of social unrest, migration, and interstate tension in countries such as Egypt, Ethiopia, 
Iraq, and Jordan.”18 This destabilization is a security risk for the US. It also discusses the 
risks of illegal, unreported, unregulated fishing helping fund transnational organized 
crime and causing ecological damage and economic effects.19 Most commercial scale 
fisheries are a mobile stock that migrate into and through international waters, so they are 
much more complicated to protect than land based agricultural production under a state’s 
control. 
External organizations have calculated additional threat assessments for the US 
that focus on climate change and on ecological risks. The Council on Strategic Risks 
assesses that “(l)osses of insect and other pollinators pose a perilous risk to some parts of 
food production. Meanwhile, industrialized countries depend critically on the global food 
network, which is becoming increasingly vulnerable to concurrent acute shocks.”20 
Discussions of protecting food as a resource is interesting in that it sometimes 
overlaps with the previous sections of food as an enabler, and how one sees the situation 
depends on one’s role in the activity. National security planning with regard to the 
 
18 U.S. Intelligence Community. “Worldwide Threat Assessment of the United States Intelligence 
Community”. 2019. https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/2019-ATA-SFR---SSCI.pdf 
19 Worldwide Threat Assessment. 
20 Schoonover, R. C. Cavallo, C. I. Caltabiano, I.  
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opportunity and risks with food must always consider the viewpoint of strategic 
competitors. China and its distant water fishing fleet is an example of this. It helps feed 
their population, helping the state achieve their own food security and enhance their 
economy. China is certainly not the only actor participating in destructive fishing 
practices, but they are a significant player. Beijing’s quest to enhance Chinese security 
through extensive fishing may be leading to insecurity for other countries that depend on 
that migrating resource that can have destabilizing effects. Spijkers, et al. examined 
decades of conflicts over fisheries and found that they are increasing and that since 2000, 
“conflict primarily involved Asian countries clashing over multiple and nonspecified 
species linked to illegal fishing practices.”21 
III. US Policies Related to Food Security 
We have seen that food security is defined in many ways, and that there are 
several approaches to think of food as it relates to national security as an enabler and a 
risk. This leads us to the discussion of US policies related to food and national security. 
The US food security history of the last decade plus can roundly be lumped into three 
independent buckets. There is no overarching strategy for security outcomes related to 
food, although the US does have a global food security strategy.22 The three silos of food 
related work are: International development efforts in less developed countries; domestic 
agricultural advancement through various policy tools; and protection of international 
 
21 Spijkers, J., Singh, G., Blasiak, R., Morrison, T.H., Le Billon, Österblom, H. “Global Patterns of 
Fisheries Conflict: Forty Years of Data.” Global Environmental Change. Volume 57. July, 2019. 
https://www.stockholmresilience.org/publications/publications/2019-05-30-global-patterns-of-fisheries-
conflict-forty-years-of-data.html. 
22 U.S. Government Global Food Security Strategy FY 2017-2021. 
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fisheries. This section will review those areas, before discussing areas of concern with 
US food security interests. 
A. International Development and the US Global Food Security Strategy 
Despite threat assessments recognizing the threat, the most recent US National 
Security Strategy (2017) discusses food on only two occasions. It mentions in passing the 
importance of protecting critical infrastructure, noting its importance to the domestic food 
supply chains. The more significant discussion about food states, “the United States will 
continue to lead the world in humanitarian assistance”, continuing “We will support food 
security and health programs that save lives and address the root cause of hunger and dis-
ease. We will support displaced people close to their homes to help meet their needs until 
they can safely and voluntarily return home.”23 
The US Global Food Security Strategy (GFSS) was released after Congress 
passed the US Global Food Security Act in 2016.24 The strategy does not encompass all 
of the functional or geographic areas in which food relates to national security at home or 
abroad. The current strategy is focused on international development and enabling 
poverty reduction and government enhancement in the developing world. It is a vestige 
from the mindset developed in the Cold War and in the post-Cold War period where the 
US was the unrivaled global leader. The US did not have major challengers to itself or 
the global system, and most of its military efforts were focused on its efforts in the 
Middle East. It had the ability to focus on improving its standing and working on soft 
 
23 U.S. Government. “National Security Strategy of the United States”. 2017. 
https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf 
24 U.S. Government Global Food Security Act.Text - S.1252 - 114th Congress (2015-2016): Global Food 




power approaches to improving its influence and standing up for US values without 
diverting resources from other hard security matters. The GFSS reflects this relatively 
stable security situation. Currently most of the program is executed through the Feed the 
Future program. It is primarily implemented through the US Agency for International 
Development (USAID), and focuses largely on the special benefits of agricultural 
development, although many agencies play a role. Ensuring food security and working 
toward the UN development goals is about making American values visible to the world, 
which has some security benefits, but it is not a strategic approach to all risks identified 
in the threat assessments. The bulk of its work focuses on twelve target countries, 
although it does work in other aligned countries and in some strategic regions.25 The US 
also delivers humanitarian assistance on an as needed basis. This can be used generally to 
support efforts against famines or after natural disasters. 
Funding mechanisms for US food security and agricultural development activities 
are complex. The Congressional Research Service estimates that the US government 
spent approximately “$1.7 billion in FY2010 to $2.6 billion in FY2013 before declining 
to $2.4 billion in FY2014”.26 They also describe that the government also spends 
significantly on “nutrition-specific activities under other global health programs and 
multilateral institutional investments in both health and food security.”27 Since then, 
GAO estimates the US Government has spent $25 billion in disbursements for global 
food security assistance (in the years 2014-2018), although the scope is broad and 
 
25 U.S. Government Global Food Security Strategy FY 2017-2021. 
26 Lawson, Marian, Schnepf, Randy, and Cook, Nicolas. “The Obama Administration’s Feed the Future 
Initiative.” Congressional Research Service. Report 7-5700/R44216. July 25, 2016. Accessed online 
February 26, 2021. http://nationalaglawcenter.org/wp-content/uploads//assets/crs/R44216.pdf 




funding totals difficult to calculate.28 One can roughly suggest the US spends between $4 
and 5 billion annually on international food security assistance programs.29  
B. Ecosystem and Food Protection: Fisheries 
Congress passed the Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated Fishing Act in 2015. It 
directs government agencies to undertake a variety of activities to limit the effects of IUU 
fishing.30 IUU fishing is now reported regularly in the Improving International Fisheries 
Management Reports to Congress from NOAA, because as the 2019 report explains, “the 
FAO considers IUU fishing a serious threat to high-value fisheries that are already 
overfished; to marine habitats, including vulnerable marine ecosystems (VMEs); and to 
food security and the economies of developing countries. IUU fishing activities have 
widespread economic and social consequences, including depriving legitimate fishermen 
of harvesting opportunities.”31 The NOAA report suggests that the illegal fishing could 
be worth tens of billions of dollars annually. Various US agencies are involved in these 
efforts to protect wild fisheries. Meanwhile, US aquaculture production is growing but is 
limited, and the US remains a major seafood importer. 
IV. Why the US’ Current Food Security Framework Is Not Optimized 
There is not one unified food security plan that integrates within the US security 
sphere. The international development approach, fisheries management operations, and 
 
28 GAO. “Letter to Congress number GAO-21-47R”. November 19, 2020. Accessed online February 26, 
2021. https://www.gao.gov/assets/720/710772.pdf 
29 This paper will use the round figure of $4.5 billion annually. 
30 U.S. Government. “Text - H.R.774 - 114th Congress (2015-2016): Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated 
Fishing Enforcement Act of 2015.” Webpage, November 5, 2015. 2015/2016. 
https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/house-bill/774/text. 
31 National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. “Improving International Fisheries Management - 
2019 Report to Congress”. 
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even domestic agriculture plan all deal in some form with food and national security. 
However, it does not appear that they have a key focus on the key national security risks 
we have seen earlier in the risk assessments from external groups and the US intelligence 
community. Gassert and Scott reminded us that although the US has the advantage in 
food production, the Chinese own the advantage in strategic planning and government 
coordination of efforts toward those plans. 
Our international development approaches have a limited focus formed in a 
previous era. They are important and have potential, but due to the nature of the type of 
long-term projects are difficult to implement in all places. So they are limited to certain 
countries meeting certain criteria that would lead to development project success, but that 
may not be the most strategically important locations. 
The US Department of Agriculture (USDA) is primarily interested in developing 
the US agricultural industry, although it does have a foreign agricultural service. 
However, USDA and its foreign agricultural service historically have looked at 
international development work primarily as a chance to develop markets to sell goods 
instead of a means to deliver security results for the US. 
This disjointed alignment in development and agriculture is just one example of 
US government efforts that do not align with our most important national security goals. 
Some elements of the Department of Defense have not yet caught up and adjusted with 
the resurgence of great power competition after spending the last two decades ready to 
fight non-state terrorist actors. Although the DoD is one of the leading agencies looking 
at climate risk - due to its huge risk - there is not a uniform understanding throughout the 
services that climate is a significant problem. The military emphasis on hard power risks 
16 
 
is not easy to convince of the security risks of environmental damage or importance of 
protecting food security as a way to help win wars. 
The US’ disjointed approach to areas where food is involved with security does 
not seem the best framework for the multilayered risks identified repeatedly in the threat 
assessments. The National Security Strategy directs activities spanning risks from great 
power competition with China and Russia to environmental risks, but makes mention of 
food only in passing. Certainly, food is not able to solve all of the areas the security 
strategy must address. But this paper attempts to understand if the current framework 
could be improved by more closely aligning food related government spending to 
security concerns with food, as there is likely more overlap than currently exists, and 
more strategic opportunities to be had with centralized planning and investment on risks 
and opportunities with fisheries. 
Kimberly Flowers of CSIS argued that the US Food Security Strategy was not 
strategically sufficient. Her main criticisms were that it was too detailed, but lacked a 
strategic focus, and laid out five outcomes to improve the strategy.32 I support the 
conclusion that the strategy needs rework, and that food security should be elevated in 
national security discussions, but differ on several of her points. That is likely because we 
take a different view of food security. Flowers appears to approach food security 
primarily from the development realm. She gives acknowledgment and uses as arguments 
at several points that food security supports US economic and security interests. But one 
key weakness not bridged is her regular reference to the positive impacts of global food 
 
32 Flowers, Kimberly. “US Policy Roadmap: A Drive to Transform Global Food and Nutrition Security.” 




security, while referring back to the fact that the approach to improving food security 
only works in countries with a preordained set of criteria: applicable countries should be 
willing partners with stable governance. That seems to undermine the argument for using 
food security development: that it can prevent risks from unstable situations that cause a 
security risk.  
The Council on Strategic Risks report recently released makes suggestions that 
ecological security risks should be elevated to the White House and integrated with 
strategic planning. The paper emphasizes ensuring resilience to these risks, and many of 
the suggested policy recommendations that are more prescriptive talk about efforts to 
ensure collaboration where possible to address issues of shared governance, like 
international fisheries.33  
V.  The Missing Opportunity Costs of Food Policies in Security Calculations:  
Might a new framework allow us better security balance against China through 
different thinking about what constitutes food security plans? 
What we have not yet seen is significant discussion of the US strategically 
incorporating fisheries security risks long term, especially with regard to competition 
with China, and applying calculations to see if we might shift investments toward new 
approaches with more government direction and assistance in case our current 
approaches to protecting fisheries do not succeed. Most discourse focuses on means to 
better manage and protect fisheries, with less emphasis on how to prepare in case those 
efforts were to fail. 
 
33 Schoonover, R. C. Cavallo, C. I. Caltabiano, I.  
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For example, the US is committed to various activities to protect international 
fisheries. However, global fishery resources are being utilized at an unsustainable clip. 
Despite all governance efforts, it is possible that more and more of these fisheries 
collapse due to fishing and environmental pressures.34 If the US has not been putting 
equivalent amounts into developing our own aquaculture resources with a strategic eye 
toward what might happen in cases that fishery is not totally protected if ocean fisheries 
were to collapse, is that the right approach? If China were to continue on the path of fish 
farming while exploiting the fisheries now, would they actually be helping themselves by 
getting more fish out of the oceans while significant stocks remain and then leaving 
themselves in a better emboldened position by having more aquaculture farming than 
anyone else in the world when the fisheries collapse? Those aquaculture production 
capabilities would increase significantly in value when capture fisheries are depleted. 
Should this scenario occur, the US would have found itself investing for years in fisheries 
protection efforts that failed but not building out aquaculture, while China had been 
exacerbating our expenditures and enhancing their economy. This would be a zero-sum 
effort with the US on the losing side of both. If that situation would come to pass, the US 
would then be in an even worse situation in competition with China going forward, 
finding itself further mismatched with regard to being a provider of a coveted food 
resource of high value and need for billions of people in countries of strategic 
importance. 
Might the US be able to dilute the risks it faces in case of collapsed fisheries 
through policy changes that direct additional strategic investments in supplying fish 
 
34 Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. “The State of World Fisheries and 
Aquaculture - 2020.” 2020. Accessed February 3, 2021. https://doi.org/10.4060/ca9229en. 
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through means other than capture fisheries? The technology for aquaculture is not 
complicated, and many species of fish can be commercially cultivated in farms on land. 
Some can realistically only be farmed or ranched in the ocean, but the US has essentially 
no offshore farming at this moment. Environmental concerns and commercial fisheries 
groups are important factors in why the US has not established a more robust offshore or 
onshore aquaculture industry. Any policy framework must take those concerns into 
account and propose solutions for addressing them as part of the strategy. 
This paper will identify key countries of concern for the US, and examine whether 
a new strategic framework can help the US improve its position in competition with 
China in the world of fisheries - a particularly interesting and important part of national 
security, which is not generally considered in US food security strategic planning. 
Anticipated Outcomes 
I expect that our outcomes will find that current US food security expenditures are 
not aligned with our biggest security risks. That would not be surprising, because the 
current use of the food security term is related to the United Nations’ definition, because 
pursuing the development agenda is important on its own right for the US’ interest, and 
because budgets are not unlimited.  
However, I also think that I will find by evaluating new frameworks within the 
special food and security sector with fisheries that there will be countries which might be 
more important for broader or higher priority US security interests than the development 
agenda because of their particular susceptibility to global fisheries risks. 
Finally, I anticipate that broadening our approach to food security focused 
primarily on agricultural development to include managing risks and opportunities with 
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capture fisheries by investing in aquaculture might help the US has the capacity to ensure 
a means of continuous fish supply to key countries of importance in case of a collapse of 
capture fisheries, enhancing US influence and our strategic positioning with China.  
VI. Methodology – Evaluations 1, 2, 3 
A strong US is good for global food security, and global food security efforts 
have been good for the US. But we face a new security environment in which the current 
food security approach in the US appears it has not been optimized to best enhance the 
ability of the US to maintain its competitive edge as the global leader - and thus its ability 
to promote food security efforts globally long term.  
The previous section explained my theory that the US needs a strategic approach 
to food to help defeat those challenges. If we can’t achieve our strategic goals, we at 
some point won’t be able to achieve our development goals. That may be due to a loss of 
privileged status as a world leader, or simply because other new challenges arise that 
make development spending less politically feasible at home. This research takes on a 
four-part evaluation:  
1. Creating a method to identify the most important countries of strategic 
significance to the US and China;  
2. Evaluating the alignment of the US’ current food security operations with 
regard to the identified strategically-important countries;  
3. Narrowing the scope to evaluate the importance of fisheries, and the risks 
and opportunities they provide for the US with regard to food security in 
strategically important countries; and 
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4. Evaluating new frameworks to consider for a more strategic approach to 
addressing fisheries opportunities and risks through aquaculture 
investments. More information on each evaluation follows: 
Evaluation 1 - What countries are most strategically important to the US and 
China? 
I first attempted to identify which countries are most important to the US and 
China to see where food security activities might potentially impact the competition 
between the two countries. I created a rubric to assess the importance of 178 countries 
identified in the Global Fragility Index for each country.35 The scoring rubrics are found 
in Appendices A and B, respectively. 
I first identified the biggest US national security challenges using information 
from a survey undertaken by the GAO that surveyed the US government about what each 
department sees as the most important long-range security risks to the US. This 2018 
unclassified report identified 26 threats, identified as follows: “long-range emerging 
threats—those that may occur in approximately 5 or more years, or those that may occur 
during an unknown timeframe—as identified by various respondents at the Department 
of Defense (DOD), Department of State (State), Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS), and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI).”36 Appendix C 
lists those identified threats.  
 
35 The Fund for Peace. “Fragile States Index.” 2018. https://fragilestatesindex.org/ 
36 U.S. Government Accountability Office. “Long-Range Emerging Threats Facing the United States As 




I had to translate some of the national security risks identified in Part A from 
concepts into specific countries where those risks are the highest.  I translated terrorism 
risks into countries using data from the Cost of War project.37  
The Cost of War data also included all countries where the US has had active 
combat in recent years. And since China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea were already 
covered by other risks listed by the GAO, I found that the terrorism list was an 
appropriate complement and sufficient in concluding all the main hard security risk 
countries.  
For the remaining risks named without countries, I chose to limit these 
translations to those security risks that could clearly be affected by government policies 
related to food security activities. Translating all risk concepts was beyond the scope of 
this study, and for many would not be particularly useful.  I focused on migration and 
climate change as the two risk concepts most necessary to be translated from non-country 
risks into measurements that allow countries to be an outcome. I used a multiplication 
combination of national fragility ranking from the Global Fragility Index and UN 
population to estimate a ranking factor in the security importance calculation to cover 
both risks.38  
I then added a variety of other information to the rubric calculating the strategic 
importance of countries to the US. I first included all nuclear weapons states as 
strategically important countries. I then used information from New America’s Natural 
 
37 Savell, Stephanie. "United States Counterterrorism Operations 2018-2020". Costs of War Project. 




38 The Fund for Peace. 
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Security Index, which had calculated data on the most important countries for both the 
US and China on a variety of different data sets.39 
I then repeated the process to find the most strategically important countries for 
China. However, some of the criteria were different than the criteria identified for the US. 
For China, I removed the terrorism listings and other categories appropriate for the US, 
and added for China’s calculation its territorial conflicts. Although not all territorial 
concerns are active fighting, I included them because China asserts its security interest is 
based in acting from a defensive position. Boundary disputes are areas of interest to 
protecting Chinese interests in its regional area in which it wants to influence. The chart 
below includes the twenty-five countries in which the US and China share mutual 
interest. 
Table 1: Countries of Strategic Importance to Both the US and China 
Countries of Strategic Importance to Both the US and China (25) 
Australia India Malaysia Russia Switzerland 
Bangladesh Indonesia Myanmar Saudi Arabia Taiwan 
Brazil Iran North Korea Singapore Thailand 
France Israel and West 
Bank Pakistan South Africa United Kingdom 
Germany Japan Philippines South Korea Vietnam 
 
 
Evaluation 2: How well does the US Feed the Future Program and US and Chinese 
foreign aid assistance line up with the US’ and China’s strategically most important 
countries as identified in Evaluation 1?  
This evaluation was straightforward. I simply compared the US Feed the Future 
focus countries and cross-referenced them with those countries identified in Evaluation 1 
 
39 Gassert, Francis and Scott, Wyatt. “Great Power Resource Competition in a Changing Climate”. New 
Security Beat. Wilson Center. January 13, 2020. Accessed online January 27, 2021.  
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to see how many of them overlapped. I then did similar for high-ranking foreign aid 
relationships for both the US and China using New America’s calculations. The specific 
questions follow. Results are covered in the discussion section.  
Question 1: Compare Feed the Future focus countries to strategically important 
countries. 
Question 2: Compare strategically important countries and Feed the Future focus 
countries with the top 10 most aid dependent countries from the US and China. 
The information on aid dependency is taken from New America’s Natural 
Security Index.40 It is important to note that this government-to-government aid 
encompasses more than money for, or provisions of, food; but that it might include these 
resources to increase food security in the recipient countries. So although this measure 
goes beyond food security, the relationship may signal an importance factor of these 
recipient countries to the US or China that I did not capture in my importance 
methodology. I did not include this factor within the strategic country calculation because 
it was heavily weighted toward smaller states - per the New America statement -  and I 
did not have a way to adequately account for the difference between a small island state’s 
importance relative to a nuclear power, for example. 
  
 
40 Scott, Wyatt et al. “Great Power Resource Competition in a Changing Climate: New America’s Natural 




Evaluation 3: How Important Are Fisheries to Each of The Countries of Strategic 
Importance to the US and to China? 
This evaluation attempts to quantify the relative importance of capture fisheries to 
each country of strategic significance to the US and to China. This measure is useful 
because it might signal the interest in future opportunities to leverage the country’s 
weaknesses should capture fisheries be depleted.  
I obtained data on capture fishery volumes for all types of finfish for each country 
from the UN Food and Agriculture Organization for the years 2014 through 2018.41 I 
cleaned the total product capture data to focus on finfish only, eliminating other aquatic 
species of plants and animals. Aquaculture production capacities on land which might 
operate as a substitute if capture fisheries are depleted are generally best suited to finfish. 
I then created five-year averages from 2014-2018 for each country’s total finfish capture. 
I chose not to evaluate trends in capture volume because I did not feel I could account for 
variability in stocks in this research. 
I then created a value of the finfish capture fishery volume per capita for each 
country. This was an attempt to measure the importance of finfish fisheries to each 
country. This, intentionally, does not separate domestic consumption versus product 
captured for export. Evaluating aquatic species import and export data was beyond the 
scope of this work as I would not have been easily able to parse out the finfish portion of 
total export and domestic consumption quantities from available data. Evaluating the 
 
41 The FAO includes in the term “fish”: fish, crustaceans, molluscs, and other aquatic animals, but excludes 
aquatic mammals, reptiles, seaweeds, and other aquatic plants. This research focuses on “Finfish”: the type 
of fish most commonly associated with the word fish: those with fins and vertebrae, like tuna, salmon, or 
minnows.   
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relative importance of the capture fisheries between countries that utilize different 
amounts for export or domestic use is also an evaluation beyond the scope of this work. 
Using the data as a ratio measuring finfish capture to total population provides a 
simple metric to compare across countries the generalized relative importance of these 
fisheries to each country. In the case studies that follow, this criteria allowed me to 
perform analyses to see how each might be relatively affected if these fisheries were to 
collapse, and how additional capital infusion for aquaculture farms might be able to 
influence each country differently. It is important to note that while the capture fishery 
data was most recent through 2018, I used 2020 population numbers because they were 
most recent. This measure is relative between countries, so I anticipate no negative 
impact on the results due to the different years within the ratio. 
VII. Results for Evaluations 1, 2, and 3 
Evaluation 1 - What countries are most strategically important to the US and 
China? 
I used the criteria in Appendix A (for US) and Appendix B (for China) to find the 
countries with most strategic significance for each. I found 54 countries of importance to 
the US, and 34 countries of importance to China. Of those countries, 25 are important to 





Table 2: The 63 Strategically Important Countries for the US and China 
US ONLY (29) BOTH (25) 
CHINA 
ONLY (9) 
Afghanistan Iraq Niger Australia Malaysia Switzerland Angola 
Bulgaria Ireland Nigeria Bangladesh Myanmar Taiwan Bhutan 
Cameroon Kenya Oman Brazil North Korea 
Thailand Brunei 
Darussalam 





China Libya Somalia Germany Philippines Vietnam Laos 
Colombia Luxembourg Syria India Russia  Mongolia 
Congo 
Democratic 
Republic Mali Tunisia Indonesia 
Saudi Arabia 
 Nepal 
Denmark Mexico Turkey 
Iran Singapore 
 Turkmenistan 
Egypt Netherlands Yemen 
Israel and 
West Bank South Africa  United States 
Ethiopia New Zealand  Japan South Korea   
 




42 This uses the UN Sustainable Development Goal regions. 
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Table 3: Regional Locations of Strategically Important Countries for the US and 
China 
Region Total Countries 
South-Eastern Asia 10 
Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao 
People's Dem. Rep., Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, 
Singapore, Thailand, Viet Nam 
Western Asia 8 
Iraq, Israel and Palestine*, Lebanon, Oman, Saudi 
Arabia, Syrian Arab Republic, Turkey, Yemen 
Southern Asia 7 
Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Iran (Islamic 
Rep. of), Nepal, Pakistan,  
Eastern Asia 6 
China, Japan, Korea, Dem. People's Rep, Korea, 
Republic of, Mongolia, Taiwan Province of China  
Western Europe 5 
France, Germany, Luxembourg, Netherlands, 
Switzerland 
Eastern Africa 3 Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia,  
Middle Africa 3 Angola, Cameroon, Congo, Dem. Rep. of the  
Northern Africa 3 Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, 
Western Africa 3 Mali, Niger, Nigeria  
South America 3 Brazil, Colombia, Peru 
Northern Europe 3 Denmark, Ireland, United Kingdom 
Northern America 2 Canada, United States of America 
Australia/New Zealand 2 Australia, New Zealand 
Eastern Europe 2 Bulgaria, Russian Federation  
Southern Africa 1 South Africa 
Central America 1 Mexico 
Central Asia 1 Turkmenistan 
Total:  63  
 
 
Evaluation 2: How well does the US Feed the Future Program and US and Chinese 
foreign aid assistance line up with the US’ and China’s strategically important 
countries as identified in Evaluation 1?  
The predictions that the US Feed the Future program not being in alignment with 
US’ most strategically important countries partially held true. One angle shows that the 
Feed the Future 2017 country lists identify programs operating in only six of the fifty-
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four countries I identified as strategically important countries for the US: Bangladesh, 
Ethiopia, Kenya, Mali, Niger, and Nigeria.  
But a different analysis tells a different story. Potentially, the Feed the Future 
targeting is relatively effective. The remaining focus countries - Ghana, Guatemala, 
Honduras, Nepal, Senegal, Uganda - do not rank as strategically important for the US. 
But that means that the strategically important countries do constitute fifty percent of the 
Feed the Future focus countries. 
Nepal is a Feed the Future country of overlap in US and Chinese interests. It does 
not rank as a country of strategic significance for the US, but it is strategically important 
to China due to past border tensions. However, Nepal also ranks in the top 10 of China’s 
military relationship countries, so potentially the strategic importance is more a positive 
than a risk.43 Bangladesh is the only Feed the Future country for the US that is also 
strategically important to both US and China. The country should be of special interest 
for US policymakers. 
When the top 10 aid dependent states are included, the US focus shows many 
states that are not strategically significant to US or China. However, US aid to 
Afghanistan and Somalia counterbalance the list. They are important as countries where 
the US has been involved in counterterrorism efforts.  
An interesting area of overlap occurs with Ethiopia and Niger. They are Feed the 
Future focus countries. However, they are also both in China’s top 10 list for aid so are 
likely of importance to them both, even though the calculation for strategic importance 
 
43 Scott, Wyatt et al. 
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did not capture them for China. These countries may be an area of particularly special 
interest for the US to consider in its competition with China. 
Table 4: Which Feed the Future Countries and Aid Receiving Countries are 
Strategically Important to the US and to China? 
 
 Feed the Future Focus 
Countries 
Top 10 US Aid 
Dependent Countries44 
(Rank in Parentheses) 






Countries to Only 
US  
Ethiopia, Kenya, Mali, 
Niger, Nigeria 
Afghanistan (tie 1), 
Somalia (tie 1),  
Ethiopia (7), Niger 
(10) 
Strategically Most 
Important to Both 
Bangladesh   
Strategically Most 
Important 
Countries to Only 
China  








Federated States of 
Micronesia (tie 1), 
Liberia (tie 1), Haiti (tie 
1), Malawi (6), Jordan 





Dominica (5), The 
Bahamas (6), 
Montenegro (8), 
Vanuatu (9),  
 
 
Results: Evaluation 3: How Important Are Fisheries to Each of The Countries of 
Importance to the US and to China? 
Calculating the data on the importance of finfish production was a measure of 
creating a five-year average and creating a per capita metric (2014-2018 average capture 
value to the 2020 population of each country). Results for the average per capita (per 
 
44 Scott, Wyatt et al. 
45 Scott, Wyatt et al. 
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1000 persons) importance of capture fisheries score for each grouping of strategic interest 
countries is as follows: 









Average Annual Capture 
Per Capita (2020 





To Both 25 1806997.14 12.99 
Only US 29 738847.97 18.80 
Only China 9 583971.31 10.42 
All US 54 1021988.163 16.22 
All China 34 1147544.45 12.49 
 
Importance of Fisheries to All Countries Strategically Important to the US and 
China 
The average annual capture per capita (per 1000) for all countries was 15.39. It 
was beyond the scope of this research to calculate ratios for all countries worldwide. 
However, a measure of comparison is below. 18 of the top 25 marine capture production 
fisheries countries are in the strategic countries list.46 It is important to caveat that the 
marine capture production fishery figure is not limited to finfish, and it is limited to 
marine areas only. So, while helpful, it is not a straight comparison to finfish capture in 
marine and inland waters. 
  
 
46 UN FAO data Norway, Chile, Morocco, Iceland, Mauritania, Spain, and Argentina are in the top 25 
marine capture countries, but not significantly important to either the US or China. 
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Table 6: Importance of Annual Freshwater and Marine Finfish Capture to All 63 
Countries Strategically Important to the US and China 























Peru 4203101.40 127.47 Yemen 148088.40 4.97 
Denmark 733173.00 126.58 Australia 119998.40 4.71 
New Zealand 393947.60 81.70 Mali 94314.60 4.66 
Oman 319258.80 62.51 Libya 27090.20 3.94 
Ireland 217056.20 43.96 Nigeria 749017.40 3.63 
Malaysia 1270070.00 39.24 Turkey 297357.20 3.53 
Myanmar 2010389.60 36.95 Egypt 323025.00 3.16 
Cambodia 609067.60 36.43 India 4328300.60 3.14 
Russian 
Federation 4466198.20 30.60 Brazil 657698.60 3.09 
Taiwan 
Province of 
China 724707.20 30.43 Germany 241910.60 2.89 
Viet Nam 2504336.40 25.73 Kenya 141799.60 2.64 
Netherlands 378443.80 22.09 
Congo, Dem. 
Rep. of the 234742.00 2.62 
Japan 2727663.80 21.57 Turkmenistan 15000.00 2.49 
Indonesia 5848617.20 21.38 Pakistan 471161.00 2.13 
Korea, 
Republic of 1072120.00 20.91 Somalia 28900.00 1.82 
Thailand 1319252.20 18.90 Saudi Arabia 54133.60 1.55 
Brunei 
Darussalam 7949.20 18.19 Colombia 78892.00 1.55 
Philippines 1886224.20 17.21 Niger 32965.80 1.36 
Angola 473281.00 14.40 Iraq 37070.80 0.92 
United States 
of America 4061766.80 12.27 Nepal 21514.00 0.74 
Canada 431663.40 11.44 Bulgaria 4313.80 0.62 
Bangladesh 1609166.60 9.77 Lebanon 3393.40 0.50 
Mexico 1223530.20 9.49 Ethiopia 51761.00 0.45 
South Africa 561219.40 9.46 
Israel and 




Dem. Rep. 67117.40 9.22 
Syrian Arab 
Republic 4236.60 0.24 
United 
Kingdom 574740.00 8.47 Switzerland 1861.40 0.22 
Iran (Islamic 
Rep. of) 693005.60 8.25 Singapore 877.00 0.15 
Tunisia 93003.40 7.87 Afghanistan 1860.00 0.05 
Cameroon 208199.20 7.84 Bhutan 11.00 0.01 
China 10966386.40 7.62 Mongolia 34.80 0.01 
Korea, Dem. 
People's Rep 187086.00 7.26 Luxembourg 0.00 0.00 
France 425663.00 6.52 AVERAGES 959414.33 15.39 
 
 
Fisheries Importance to 25 Countries Strategically Important to Both: 
Interesting here is that the top eleven countries (excluding the US) where fisheries 
are most important relative to population are in Asia. All except for Bangladesh fall 
above the average tons per capita (per 1000 persons) of 12.99, meaning that capture 
fisheries are relatively more important to them than to the countries with smaller ratios. 
China, with the largest absolute capture, actually sits in the middle of the pack. Its ratio 
places it behind the eleven Asian countries already mentioned, as well as the US, South 





Table 7: Importance of Annual Freshwater and Marine Finfish Capture to US, 
China, and the 25 Countries Strategically Important to Both of Them, 2014-2018  























Malaysia 1270070.00 39.24 
Iran (Islamic 
Rep. of) 693005.60 8.25 
Myanmar 2010389.60 36.95 China 10966386.40 7.62 
Russian 
Federation 4466198.20 30.60 
Korea, Dem. 
People's Rep 187086.00 7.26 
Taiwan 
Province of 
China 724707.20 30.43 France 425663.00 6.52 
Viet Nam 2504336.40 25.73 Australia 119998.40 4.71 
Japan 2727663.80 21.57 India 4328300.60 3.14 
Indonesia 5848617.20 21.38 Brazil 657698.60 3.09 
Korea, Republic 
of 1072120.00 20.91 Germany 241910.60 2.89 
Thailand 1319252.20 18.90 Pakistan 471161.00 2.13 
Philippines 1886224.20 17.21 Saudi Arabia 54133.60 1.55 
United States of 
America 4061766.80 12.27 
Israel and 
Palestine 4369.00 0.32 
Bangladesh 1609166.60 9.77 Switzerland 1861.40 0.22 
South Africa 561219.40 9.46 Singapore 877.00 0.15 
United 
Kingdom 574740.00 8.47 AVERAGES 1806997.14 12.99 
 
Fisheries Importance to 29 Countries Strategically Important to Only the US: 
The average importance for capture fisheries for countries strategically important 
to the US only was nearly fifty percent higher than the category with countries of shared 
importance. This was heavily skewed by the importance of Peru and Denmark, whose per 
capita rankings were both approximately six times the overall category average. But 
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those were not the only countries with high rankings of importance; eleven of the twenty-
nine had ratios over seven. See Appendix D for all results. 
Fisheries Importance to Countries Strategically Important Only to China: 
The average importance of fisheries to countries I calculated as strategically 
important only to China had a significantly lower average importance ratio than those 
important only to the US. However, the number was similar to the importance ratio for 
the countries of shared importance.  
This is a significant finding to have such a low importance ratio. I did not expect 
that result. Five of the nine countries have almost all of the capture importance. But they 
are balanced out by the countries with whom China shares land borders, for whom 
capture fisheries are relatively small. See Appendix E for all results. 
Fisheries Importance to All 54 Countries Strategically Important to the US 
The importance of fisheries to all the countries important to the US is 
significantly higher than for China. I did not expect this result. This puts added 
importance for the US on understanding these risks of a potential fisheries collapse. It 
also sets the stage for China to be able to both add pressure to the US with overfishing 
while providing for its own needs. See Appendix F for all results. 
Fisheries Importance to All 34 Countries Strategically Important to China 
This chart shows an increase in importance of fisheries when reincorporating 
countries of shared interest with the US. The approximately twenty percent increase is 
accounted for mostly by the maritime nations of Asia that made up most of the top ten 
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fisheries reliant countries of those important for both the US and China. See Appendix G 
for all results. 
How Do these Compare In Importance with Global Finfish Capture Fisheries? 
These fisheries are significant. The top 15 strategically important countries by 
average capture fishery margin account for 63.2% of the global finfish capture fishery. 
The other 48 countries account for another 13.99% of the global average total annual 




Table 8: Relative Importance to Global Capture Totals of the Top 15 Strategically 
Important Countries to US and China as Ranked by 5 Year Average Finfish 






Capture - 5 year avg 
% of strategic country 
Total 5 year avg (all 
finfish) 
Capture - 5 year avg % of global 
5 year average ending 2018 (all 
finfish) 
China 10966386.4 18.14% 14.00% 
Indonesia 5848617.2 9.68% 7.47% 
Russian 
Federation 4466198.2 7.39% 5.70% 
India 4328300.6 7.16% 5.53% 
Peru 4203101.4 6.95% 5.37% 
United States 
of America 4061766.8 6.72% 5.19% 
Japan 2727663.8 4.51% 3.48% 
Viet Nam 2504336.4 4.14% 3.20% 
Myanmar 2010389.6 3.33% 2.57% 
Philippines 1886224.2 3.12% 2.41% 
Bangladesh 1609166.6 2.66% 2.05% 
Thailand 1319252.2 2.18% 1.68% 
Malaysia 1270070 2.10% 1.62% 
Mexico 1223530.2 2.02% 1.56% 
Korea, 






VIII. Case Studies for a New Food Security Framework Involving Aquaculture as a 
Strategic National Security Investment 
Can a new framework based on strategic considerations about fish and its role in 
food security and national security more broadly give the US better balance against 
China, while maintaining focus on improving food security outcomes?  
I compare four frameworks relating to the US’ food security efforts to include 
planning for risks associated with fisheries for the US, and how they relate to our 
competition with China. I propose three new frameworks to compare with a “no change 




Table 9: Case Study Scenarios 
Case Name Case Description 
Case 1  
 
The US approach to international development and fisheries management remains unchanged. 
The government has no strategic investment plan for aquaculture in terms of competition with 
China and being prepared with regard to the potential for capture fisheries collapse.  
Case 2 
The US provides $4.5 billion in food security funding for capital investments in finfish 
aquaculture facilities in Feed the Future focus countries strategically important to either the US, 
China, or both. I selected this arbitrary value because it is approximately what the US spends in 
one year of operation on overseas expenditures on food programs through Feed the Future and 
the other seven programs.47  
Countries: Bangladesh, Ethiopia, Kenya, Mali, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria 
Case 3 
The US provides $4.5 billion in food security funding for capital investments in finfish 
aquaculture facilities in the countries of shared strategic importance to the US and China, where 
their per capita fisheries importance ranks in the top 15 highest among the 25 countries 
strategically important to both. 
Countries: Bangladesh, Indonesia; Iran (Islamic Rep. of); Japan; Korea, Dem. People's Rep; 
Korea, Republic of; Malaysia; Myanmar; Philippines; Russian Federation; South Africa; 
Taiwan Province of China; Thailand; United Kingdom; Viet Nam 
Case 4 
US invests $4.5 billion to support capital investment in aquaculture projects in the US under the 
umbrella of food security and national security justifications.48 In this case, the money would 
help increase US capacity to produce finfish. Determining the role of government or the method 





47  GAO. “Letter to Congress number GAO-21-47R”. November 19, 2020. Accessed online February 26, 
2021. https://www.gao.gov/assets/720/710772.pdf 
48 I considered but ultimately decided against a research approach substituting new aquaculture funding in 
place of Feed the Future efforts. The comparisons are beyond the scope of this paper. 
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Methodology and Results for Case Study Analyses 
Total US aquaculture production in 2017 was worth only approximately $1.2 
billion, and US aquaculture production volumes have remained relatively constant at 
levels significantly less than they were in the early 2000’s.49 US capture fishery 
production is approximately ten times larger than the aquaculture production, at around 5 
million tons annually.50 However, the capture fisheries employ less than 175,000 people, 
and the US remains the world’s largest importer of fish and fishery products.51 So 
although the US is the world’s sixth largest capturer of finfish, the industry is a small 
contributor to the US economy.  
The last three case study frameworks would incorporate fisheries risks to a higher 
role in national security and expand the definition of food security usage, as several of the 
schools of thought discussed earlier argue it should be. But unlike those angles 
approaching the issue so far, this paper approaches the issue by assuming that wild 
capture fisheries may essentially collapse.  
If capture fisheries disappeared, what would the security outcomes and 
opportunity costs of not acting in advance look like?  What should the US do now to 
minimize risks if that were to occur? Would broadening the approach to food security and 
funding aquaculture investments improve national security outcomes without 
jeopardizing the mission to improve global food security? Or, would the results be 
insignificant and signal to policymakers that keeping the status quo might be just as 
 
49 Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations - Fisheries Division. “Fishery and Aquaculture 






effective? I evaluated the scenarios and judged the potential for US to invest overseas to 
supply fish to individual countries or to groups of countries, or to increase US 
aquaculture production capacity domestically to be supplied as needed. Success is 
measured for each situation as relative comparison between current country trends and 
how US investments might alter those. 
Case 1: 
I calculate projected rates of aquaculture growth for each strategically important 
country to calculate the projected total aquaculture production volume of each country in 
2035, assuming no changes to the rate of growth. I calculate aquaculture per capita in 
2035, and measure the difference compared with the capture fishery per capita of 2020. 
The results skewed heavily toward countries being unable to replace their capture 
fishery with aquaculture production should fisheries collapse. Only 22 of 63 countries are 
projected to have more aquaculture production per capita in 2035 than average capture 
fishery per capita from 2014-2018 (using 2020 population). Of the 41 who will have less 
overall fish production, they skewed toward having much larger deficits than the 22 had 
in gains. See Appendix I for full results.  
Appendix J examines the same data but sorts it by the projected volume 
percentage of total projected aquaculture in 2035. Only 9 countries had more than one 
percent of the market, each. But they combine to have 92.35 percent of the total 
aquaculture production of the 63 strategically important countries. The top five alone 




Table 10: Nine Countries Projected to Control the 2035 Aquaculture Market  
Country 















I analyzed the impact on aquaculture production of providing $4.5 billion on each 
country separately, and on splitting $4.5 billion equally among the seven countries. A 
3600 annual metric ton recirculating facility requires on average approximately 
$94,824,000 capital investment.52 I round here to $100 million investment for 4000 
metric tons annually per fish farm to create a formula to translate government investment 
into volume of aquaculture production increase. Investing $4.5 billion should result in 
complete capital costs for 45 recirculating aquaculture farms for finfish production. 
Those farms, in total, should produce approximately 180,000 tons of finfish annually. 
Investing all of the $4.5 billion for aquaculture in Mali, Niger, or Kenya would 
create significant return on investment in each country in terms of each country’s ability 
to increase its production of fish. This is because current production is low. Investing in 
 
52 Bailey, Laura and Vinci, Brian. “Show me the money: Economies of scale for land-based recirculating 




Nepal and Ethiopia would see marginal returns for the US in this scenario. This 
investment plan would not make much sense in Nigeria or Bangladesh, as the impact 
would be marginal on their per capita changes. Sharing the funding equally resulted in 
significant reductions in impact in those where the results of individually focused 
investment could have been highly impactful, and does not appear to be a good choice. 
Policymakers would also have to grapple with the challenges of ensuring the project 
returns were channeled appropriately in a way that enhances the US interest; this could be 
a challenging scenario especially in those states significant because of the US 
counterterrorism efforts there. See Appendix K for full results. 
Case 3:  
I calculated the impact of US investment in the fifteen countries previously 
described in the same manner as I did for Case 2. In Case 3, Taiwan, South Korea, 
Malaysia, and North Korea on paper would get the best return on investment for the US 
in the scenario of focusing funding on one country. The first three would be particularly 
good, as they have some of the most significant drops in aquaculture production 
predictions relative to their capture fishery averages. North Korea’s drop in this category 
was less significant. Regardless, it would not be a candidate for investment due to the 
nature of the relationship with the US. See Appendix L for full results. 
Case 4: 
I anticipated Case 4 would make the case that the US should invest in aquaculture 
development at home where it controls production and could offer a competing market to 
China should fisheries collapse in the next few decades. I evaluated the projected 
aquaculture situation in 2035 and found the following:  
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2035 given 2018 
growth rate 























US 267805.08 0.32% 180000.00 447805.08 0.53% 
China 35427350.15 41.9%    
 
 
On one hand, the investment described in Case 4 is significant for the US because 
it would nearly double the current projected amount of anticipated US aquaculture 
production. On the other hand, the results show that this amount of investment is rather 
insignificant. Even doubling US aquaculture production in the US brings it to only one 
percent of the total projected aquaculture production, while China would control in this 
scenario approximately 42 percent of global aquaculture production. China’s aquaculture 
value in relative terms to countries of strategic interest is even more striking.  
However, it is important to consider that China’s domestic market will still 
demand fish. So the absolute dominance of the market will be tempered somewhat by 
providing for their own population when capture fisheries have been depleted. However, 
recall that China’s capture fishery importance was, per capita, only in the middle of the 
pack of the 25 strategic countries. So although there will still be domestic demand for 
Chinese aquaculture, the size of production opens up even greater opportunities to use 
their fish production leverage abroad to provide fish to other countries than they can do 





I anticipated Case 4 would show a huge strategic opportunity for the US to be 
able to better compete with China. But instead of a convincing case to invest, it appears it 
is a much greater strategic risk that does not look hopeful for US policymakers even if 
Congress acted quickly. Certainly, not taking any action would exacerbate challenges 
with China because of the influence they would have when fisheries collapsed. Knowing 
that they have a long run advantage actually gives Beijing at least one reason to consider 
taking the risk to continue to push the capture fisheries further, knowing they would stand 
to gain relative to others – and especially relative to the US. In the interim, the US would 
face some significant challenges to implement any funding or construction capable of 
closing the aquaculture gap. Given the scale of investment it would require to even make 
a significant contribution towards closing the gap, the US may need to explore different 
options if it is serious about managing the risk of China having control over such an 
important food source for so much of the world. 
With the world’s largest population and as a net food importer, China’s leadership 
has a vested interest in ensuring its population has access to food. Few things are more 
risky to a government’s legitimacy than failing to ensure your population has adequate 
access to food. Food insecurity can turn a population against a government more than 
other resources. But since that goes for all countries, China can use that as an advantage. 
Most literature considers Chinese overfishing from a snapshot of the moment, 
seeing their fisheries exploitation as a means of cheaply feeding their population from an 
abundant supply. But this research shows that there could be secondary benefits to China 
within the umbrella of food security to continuing to exploit the oceans. Many key 
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countries for China and the US are heavily reliant on fish - and most are not well 
positioned with aquaculture to meet their demand. Decreased capture fisheries increase 
China’s leverage with those countries as aquaculture becomes relatively more important. 
This research shows that the US has very little similar leverage, even if undertook a 
significant funding program of $4.5 billion. Potentially, future research by others may 
propose a better assessment and generate different results. 
Should fisheries actually collapse, the value for aquaculture products will 
skyrocket accordingly. Economists would suggest that at that time, new players will enter 
the market and drive down the price. However, capital will be needed to deploy new 
aquaculture facility construction to replace a capture fisheries system that was essentially 
infrastructure free. But this research suggests China will control nearly half the existing 
global market with established production systems if and when that occurred. If Beijing 
was interested in deterring new entrants to the aquaculture market and maintaining their 
market share, they would be well positioned to manipulate aquaculture investment 
markets by pricing their production in already-build infrastructure lower than the cost at 
which others can justify investment - at least those lower than breakeven costs in lower 
domestic demand, higher GDP market driven economies like the United States. This is 
either strategic planning, or good fortune to have developed a robust aquaculture 
production at massive scale sooner than competitors, or both. But either way, US 
strategic interests are at stake, because fisheries are important to countries that are very 
important to the US, and to China. If global fisheries were to collapse, this research finds 
that those looking for fish for their populations would be absolutely reliant on China to 
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provide it, or on Beijing to at least to allow fair competition conditions for other countries 
to enter the market as aquaculture producers. 
Limitations:  
Certainly, no evaluation of the most important countries can ever account for the 
importance of all countries adequately. I acknowledge that many approaches will look 
differently and come up with many different countries than I did.  
I recognize that fisheries and food security are just one of dozens of strategic 
interests at play in the US-China relationship. In no way do I believe that fisheries only 
will drive the actions of the security relationship. However, this paper shows that 
fisheries are important to many of the countries evaluated here, and thus, should be 
considered an important part of the security balance. They are both a risk to be managed, 
and an opportunity to gain influence. 
IX. Conclusion 
Is China okay with the potential to completely collapse capture fisheries? Or are 
they interested in maintaining sustainable harvests for perpetuity? It is beyond the scope 
of this study to answer that question. But I believe that this research has been beneficial 
in presenting a new way to analyze countries of importance, and to understand the 
potential opportunities and limitations for the US to addressing strategic interests and 
food security simultaneously through investments in aquaculture. 
There is much to learn about this topic, and future research can expand on this 
initial cursory analysis in a variety of ways to further enhance the literature on the 
subject. What is clear is that food security, as defined by the international development 
agenda and enshrined in US law via the Global Food Security Act, is limited by the scope 
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of how we see it. A holistic analysis of threats and opportunities to address those threats 
has shown that security can be impacted by US action or inaction on food policies, 
especially in our competition with China. 
This research did not find an overwhelmingly beneficial new approach to 
addressing food security and fisheries risks. The status quo approach to managing 
fisheries risk should continue in the interim, except that the issue should get more 
attention and strategic leadership. The current whole of government approach to 
addressing food and security is too disjointed and too disparately directed to understand 
how food is related to security. It fails as set up now to see the opportunity costs we face 
by keeping policies as they are. A broader scope to food security might be helpful - but it 
should be coupled with the vision and resources to use any new capabilities efficiently 









Appendix A - Calculating the Most Strategically Important Countries for US 
 
Criteria for identifying strategically important countries for US 
Category Explanation Notes 
Nuclear Weapon States Public information  
Specific states listed in the GAO 
security risk report as a long-
range security threat to US 
China, Russia, Iran, North 
Korea 
 
10 most important countries - 
resource dependence 
As calculated by New 
America foundation natural 
security index 
Composite measure of resource dependence for 
US on countries for the following resources: 24 
strategic minerals, 9 commodity metals, energy 
(coal, gas, oil), and agriculture (coffee, maize, 
milk, palm, pork, poultry, rice, soy, sugar, 
wheat) 
10 Most important countries - 
military coordination 
As calculated by New 
America foundation natural 
security index 
Includes combined military exercises, arms 
imports, and arms exports.  
10 Most important countries - 
Trade volume 
As calculated by New 
America foundation natural 
security index 
 
10 Most important countries - 
Foreign direct investment (one of 
4 cultural and soft power) 
As calculated by New 
America foundation natural 
security index 
 
Terrorism concerns: States where 
US is active in combatting 
terrorism 
Defined by the Costs of 
War project research 
tracking US activities as 
follows: 
 
Countries where US had  air strikes or ground 
combat or 127e programs. I did not include the 
terrorist training exercises as many were likely 
already included in the new america military 
relationships situation. Since this includes 
already Iraq and Afghanistan, I did not include a 
separate listing for countries where US had 
troops in conflict since 9/11.  
 
Population  Any country in the top 20 largest population 
according to the UN is included, if not included 
already by other categories.  
Combined: Foreign government 
capacity and stability and 
internal and international 
migration risk 
 I created a factor of the product of the Global 
Fragility Ranking and the population of the 
country. The top 20 highest combination scores 
are included. 
 
Note 1:  Starting Country List was the 178 identified in the Global Fragility Index. This 
does not match with the UN population list of countries. I manually pulled the population 
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data only for those countries listed in the 178 starting countries when assessing 
population and the fragility * population multiplier.) 
 
Note 2: I used as the starting list of countries the 178 identified in the Global Fragility 
Index. Taiwan was not included in that list. I included Taiwan as a country of strategic 
importance for both the US and China. However, I did that after calculating for 
population and fragility multipliers; those lists were drawn from the data from 178 
countries with matching population data from the UN. 
 
Note 3: I considered but ultimately did not use a Western Hemisphere multiplier to 
increase the fragility x population index scores to rank countries. Those countries do 
present increase risk of migration to the US over the connected continent; but the 
migration risk identified by GAO looks at internal and external migration and this would 
have given too much weight on external migration to the US. External migration in other 
parts of the world may have a more significant impact on US security than migration to 
the US border. A second reason is that it would overfactor compared to internal migration 
and the risks of migration to megacities globally, which I could not account for in this 




Appendix B: Calculating the Most Strategically Important Countries for China 
 
 
Criteria for identifying strategically important countries for China 
Category Explanation Notes 
Nuclear Weapon States Public information  
10 most important countries - 
resource dependence 
As calculated by New 
America foundation natural 
security index 
Composite measure of resource dependence for 
China on countries for the following resources: 
24 strategic minerals, 9 commodity metals, 
energy (coal, gas, oil), and agriculture (coffee, 
maize, milk, palm, pork, poultry, rice, soy, sugar, 
wheat) 
10 Most important countries - 
military coordination 
As calculated by New 
America foundation natural 
security index 
Includes combined military exercises, arms 
imports, and arms exports.  
10 Most important countries - 
Trade volume 
As calculated by New 
America foundation natural 
security index 
 
10 Most important countries - 
Foreign direct investment  
As calculated by New 
America foundation natural 
security index 
 
Iran None Added as a trade partner based on the March 
2021 long term trade deal, although they are not 
listed in New America’s top 10 trading partners. 
Territorial disputes Public information 16 countries with territorial disputes with China, 
maritime and terrestrial (includes Taiwan, which 
I added independently for the US) 
 
Note 1:  Starting Country List was the 178 identified in the Global Fragility Index. This 
does not match with the UN population list of countries. I manually pulled the population 
data only for those countries listed in the 178 starting countries when assessing 
population and the fragility * population multiplier.) 
 
Note 2: I used as the starting list of countries the 178 identified in the Global Fragility 
Index. Taiwan was not included in that list. I included Taiwan as a country of strategic 
importance for both the US and China. However, I did that after calculating for 
population and fragility multipliers; those lists were drawn from the data from 178 
countries with matching population data from the UN. 
 
Note 3: I included all territorial disputes as automatically strategically important for 
China. However, it is possible that currently marine disputes are actually significantly 
more important than territorial disputes on land. However, this analysis treats them all 
equally.   
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Appendix C - Long-Range Emerging Threats Facing the United States 
Source: U.S. Government Accountability Office. “Long-Range Emerging Threats Facing the 
United States As Identified by Federal Agencies” GAO-19-204SP: Published: Dec 13, 2018.  
 
26 Long-Range Emerging Threats Facing the United States As Identified by Federal 
Agencies 
Chinese Global Expansion» China is marshalling its diplomatic, economic, and military resources to 
facilitate its rise as a regional and global power. This may challenge U.S. access to air, space, 
cyberspace, and maritime domains. China’s use of cyberspace and electronic warfare could impact 
various U.S. systems and operations. 
Russian Global Expansion» Russia is increasing its capability to challenge the United States across 
multiple warfare domains, including attempting to launch computer-based directed energy attacks 
against U.S. military assets. Russia is also increasing its military and political presence in key locations 
across the world. 
Iranian Political and Military Developments» Iran is expanding its influence by increasing the size and 
capabilities of its network of military, intelligence, and surrogate forces, while increasing economic 
activities in other areas of the world. Iran will also likely continue to develop its military capabilities, 
including developing technology that could be used for intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) and 
improving its offensive cyberspace operations. 
North Korean Military Developments» North Korea is developing capabilities to strike North America 
and its allies with long-range missiles and may produce significant numbers of intercontinental ballistic 
missiles. 
Foreign Government Capacity and Stability» Violent extremist organizations may proliferate in 
countries that have limited governing capacity and are facing conflict, which may result in a higher risk 
of terrorist attacks and increased demand for U.S. resources to counter them. Countries in Africa, Latin 
America, and the Caribbean may experience instability based on conflict, which may lead to 
humanitarian disasters and government collapses.  
Terrorism» Violent ideologies could influence additional individuals to turn to terrorism to achieve their 
goals across Africa, Asia, and the Middle East. Terrorists could advance their tactics, including building 
nuclear, biological or chemical weapons, or increase their use of online communications to reach new 
recruits and disseminate propaganda.  
New Alliances and Adversaries» The United States could face challenges from potential new state 
adversaries and non-state adversaries (e.g., private corporations obtaining resources that could grant 
them more influence than states).  
Information Operations» Adversaries—such as Russia, Iran, and China—may engage in advanced 
information operations campaigns that use social media, artificial intelligence, and data analytics to 
undermine the United States and its allies.  
Artificial Intelligence (AI)» Adversaries could gain increased access to AI through affordable designs 
used in the commercial industry, and could apply AI to areas such as weapons and technology.  
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Quantum Information Science» Quantum communications could enable adversaries to develop secure 
communications that U.S. personnel would not be able to intercept or decrypt. Quantum computing may 
allow adversaries to decrypt information, which could enable them to target U.S. personnel and military 
operations. 
Internet of Things (IoT)» The United States may face difficulties protecting networks and data as IoT 
grows and traditional approaches for security (e.g., encryption) may no longer effectively protect 
information. Adversaries could also disrupt IoT-enabled critical infrastructure and devices. 
Autonomous and Unmanned Systems» Adversaries are developing autonomous capabilities that could 
recognize faces, understand gestures, and match voices of U.S. personnel, which could compromise U.S. 
operations. Unmanned ground, underwater, air, and space vehicles may be used for combat and 
surveillance. 
Biotechnology» Actors—which may include state or non-state entities such as violent extremist 
organizations and transnational criminal organizations—could alter genes or create DNA to modify 
plants, animals, and humans. Such biotechnologies could be used to enhance the performance of military 
personnel. The proliferation of synthetic biology—used to create genetic code that does not exist in 
nature—may increase the number of actors that can create chemical and biological weapons. 
Other Emerging Technologies» Actors may gain access to new technologies previously limited to 
militaries, such as affordable and sophisticated encryption technologies, which would hinder U.S. efforts 
to monitor terrorist and criminal activities. Other emerging technologies—such as additive 
manufacturing (i.e., 3D printing)—may be vulnerable to cyber attacks or be used to manufacture 
restricted materials, such as weapons. 
Weapons of Mass Destruction» An increasing number of actors may gain access to these weapons. 
Adversaries could steal nuclear materials from existing facilities or develop new types of biological 
weapons using genetic engineering and synthetic biology. 
Electronic Warfare» Adversaries are developing electronic attack weapons to target U.S. systems with 
sensitive electronic components, such as military sensors, communication, navigation, and information 
systems. These weapons are intended to degrade U.S. capabilities and could restrict situational 
awareness or may affect military operations. 
Hypersonic Weapons» China and Russia are pursuing hypersonic weapons because their speed, altitude, 
and maneuverability may defeat most missile defense systems, and they may be used to improve long-
range conventional and nuclear strike capabilities. There are no existing countermeasures. 
Counterspace Weapons» China and Russia are developing anti-satellite weapons to threaten U.S. space 
operations. China is developing capabilities to conduct large-scale anti-satellite strikes using novel 
physical, cyber, and electronic warfare means.  
Missiles» Adversaries are developing missile technology to attack the United States in novel ways and 
challenge U.S. missile defense, including conventional and nuclear ICBMs, sea-launched land-attack 
missiles, and space-based missiles that could orbit the earth. 
Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance (ISR) Platforms» Future advances in AI, sensors, data 
analytics, and space-based platforms could create an environment of “ubiquitous ISR”, where people and 
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equipment could be tracked throughout the world in near-real time. China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea 
are developing multiple ISR platforms.  
Aircraft» China and Russia are developing new aircraft, including stealth aircraft, which could fly faster, 
carry advanced weapons, and achieve greater ranges. Such aircraft could force U.S. aircraft to operate at 
farther distances and put more U.S. targets at risk. 
Undersea Weapons» Russia has made significant advancements in submarine technology and tactics to 
escape detection by U.S. forces. China is developing underwater acoustic systems that could coordinate 
swarm attacks—the use of large quantities of simple and expendable assets to overwhelm opponents—
among vehicles and provide greater undersea awareness. Adversaries could achieve breakthroughs in 
anti-submarine warfare—such as using AI to locate U.S. submarines—or attack U.S. undersea 
infrastructure, which could cripple communications. 
Cyber Weapons» Adversaries, such as China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea, may launch cyber attacks 
against critical U.S. infrastructure (e.g., electric, oil and gas, and nuclear power systems) and military 
infrastructure (e.g., communications and ISR platforms). Adversaries could also launch cyber attacks on 
the U.S. health care system, threatening patient safety by disrupting access to medical care. Finally, 
adversaries are also developing tools to directly attack hardware and embedded components in aviation 
systems, which can manipulate or destroy data. 
Infectious Diseases» New and evolving diseases from the natural environment—exacerbated by changes 
in climate, the movement of people into cities, and global trade and travel—may become a pandemic. 
Drug-resistant forms of diseases previously considered treatable could become widespread again. 
Climate Change» Extreme weather events—such as hurricanes and megadroughts—could intensify and 
affect food security, energy resources, and the health care sector. Diminishing permafrost could expand 
habitats for pathogens that cause disease. The loss of Arctic sea ice could open previously closed sea 
routes, potentially increasing Russian and Chinese access to the region and challenging the freedom of 
navigation that the United States currently has.  
Internal and International Migration» Governments in megacities (i.e., over 10 million people) across 
Asia, Latin America, and Africa may not have the capacity to provide adequate resources and 
infrastructure, and may be vulnerable to natural or man-made disasters. Mass migration events may 








Appendix D: Importance of Annual Freshwater and Marine Finfish Capture to the 29 
Countries Strategically Important Only to the US 
























Peru 4203101.40 127.47 Turkey 297357.20 3.53 
Denmark 733173.00 126.58 Egypt 323025.00 3.16 
New Zealand 393947.60 81.70 Kenya 141799.60 2.64 
Oman 319258.80 62.51 
Congo, Dem. Rep. 
of the 234742.00 2.62 
Ireland 217056.20 43.96 Somalia 28900.00 1.82 
Netherlands 378443.80 22.09 Colombia 78892.00 1.55 
Canada 431663.40 11.44 Niger 32965.80 1.36 
Mexico 1223530.20 9.49 Iraq 37070.80 0.92 
Tunisia 93003.40 7.87 Bulgaria 4313.80 0.62 
Cameroon 208199.20 7.84 Lebanon 3393.40 0.50 
China 10966386.40 7.62 Ethiopia 51761.00 0.45 
Yemen 148088.40 4.97 
Syrian Arab 
Republic 4236.60 0.24 
Mali 94314.60 4.66 Afghanistan 1860.00 0.05 
Libya 27090.20 3.94 Luxembourg 0.00 0.00 





Appendix E: Importance of Annual Freshwater and Marine Finfish Capture to the 9 
Countries Strategically Important Only to China 













Cambodia 609067.60 36.43 
Brunei Darussalam 7949.20 18.19 
Angola 473281.00 14.40 
United States of America 4061766.80 12.27 
Lao People's Dem. Rep. 67117.40 9.22 
Turkmenistan 15000.00 2.49 
Nepal 21514.00 0.74 
Bhutan 11.00 0.01 
Mongolia 34.80 0.01 





Appendix F: Importance of Annual Freshwater and Marine Finfish Capture to All 54 
Countries Strategically Important to the US 

























Peru 4203101.40 127.47 Australia 119998.40 4.71 
Denmark 733173.00 126.58 Mali 94314.60 4.66 
New Zealand 393947.60 81.70 Libya 27090.20 3.94 
Oman 319258.80 62.51 Nigeria 749017.40 3.63 
Ireland 217056.20 43.96 Turkey 297357.20 3.53 
Malaysia 1270070.00 39.24 Egypt 323025.00 3.16 
Myanmar 2010389.60 36.95 India 4328300.60 3.14 
Russian Federation 4466198.20 30.60 Brazil 657698.60 3.09 
Taiwan Province of China 724707.20 30.43 Germany 241910.60 2.89 
Viet Nam 2504336.40 25.73 Kenya 141799.60 2.64 
Netherlands 378443.80 22.09 
Congo, Dem. 
Rep. of the 234742.00 2.62 
Japan 2727663.80 21.57 Pakistan 471161.00 2.13 
Indonesia 5848617.20 21.38 Somalia 28900.00 1.82 
Korea, Republic of 1072120.00 20.91 Saudi Arabia 54133.60 1.55 
Thailand 1319252.20 18.90 Colombia 78892.00 1.55 
Philippines 1886224.20 17.21 Niger 32965.80 1.36 
Canada 431663.40 11.44 Iraq 37070.80 0.92 
Bangladesh 1609166.60 9.77 Bulgaria 4313.80 0.62 
Mexico 1223530.20 9.49 Lebanon 3393.40 0.50 
South Africa 561219.40 9.46 Ethiopia 51761.00 0.45 
United Kingdom 574740.00 8.47 
Israel and 
Palestine 4369.00 0.32 
Iran (Islamic Rep. of) 693005.60 8.25 
Syrian Arab 
Republic 4236.60 0.24 
Tunisia 93003.40 7.87 Switzerland 1861.40 0.22 
Cameroon 208199.20 7.84 Singapore 877.00 0.15 
China 10966386.40 7.62 Afghanistan 1860.00 0.05 
Korea, Dem. People's Rep 187086.00 7.26 Luxembourg 0.00 0.00 
France 425663.00 6.52 AVERAGES 1021988.163 16.22 




Appendix G: Importance of Annual Freshwater and Marine Finfish Capture to All 34 
Countries Strategically Important to China 






















Malaysia 1270070.00 39.24 
Iran (Islamic 
Rep. of) 693005.60 8.25 
Myanmar 2010389.60 36.95 
Korea, Dem. 
People's Rep 187086.00 7.26 
Cambodia 609067.60 36.43 France 425663.00 6.52 
Russian 
Federation 4466198.20 30.60 Australia 119998.40 4.71 
Taiwan 
Province of 
China 724707.20 30.43 India 4328300.60 3.14 
Viet Nam 2504336.40 25.73 Brazil 657698.60 3.09 
Japan 2727663.80 21.57 Germany 241910.60 2.89 
Indonesia 5848617.20 21.38 Turkmenistan 15000.00 2.49 
Korea, 
Republic of 1072120.00 20.91 Pakistan 471161.00 2.13 
Thailand 1319252.20 18.90 Saudi Arabia 54133.60 1.55 
Brunei 
Darussalam 7949.20 18.19 Nepal 21514.00 0.74 
Philippines 1886224.20 17.21 
Israel and 
Palestine 4369.00 0.32 
Angola 473281.00 14.40 Switzerland 1861.40 0.22 
United States 
of America 4061766.80 12.27 Singapore 877.00 0.15 
Bangladesh 1609166.60 9.77 Bhutan 11.00 0.01 
South Africa 561219.40 9.46 Mongolia 34.80 0.01 
Lao People's 
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China 10966386.4 18.14% 14.00% Germany 241910.6 0.40% 0.31% 
Indonesia 5848617.2 9.68% 7.47% 
Congo, 
Dem. Rep. 
of the 234742 0.39% 0.30% 
Russian 
Federation 4466198.2 7.39% 5.70% Ireland 217056.2 0.36% 0.28% 
India 4328300.6 7.16% 5.53% Cameroon 208199.2 0.34% 0.27% 




Rep 187086 0.31% 0.24% 
United 
States of 
America 4061766.8 6.72% 5.19% Yemen 148088.4 0.25% 0.19% 
Japan 2727663.8 4.51% 3.48% Kenya 141799.6 0.23% 0.18% 
Viet Nam 2504336.4 4.14% 3.20% Australia 119998.4 0.20% 0.15% 
Myanmar 2010389.6 3.33% 2.57% Mali 94314.6 0.16% 0.12% 
Philippines 1886224.2 3.12% 2.41% Tunisia 93003.4 0.15% 0.12% 
Bangladesh 1609166.6 2.66% 2.05% Colombia 78892 0.13% 0.10% 
Thailand 1319252.2 2.18% 1.68% 
Lao 
People's 
Dem. Rep. 67117.4 0.11% 0.09% 
Malaysia 1270070 2.10% 1.62% 
Saudi 
Arabia 54133.6 0.09% 0.07% 
Mexico 1223530.2 2.02% 1.56% Ethiopia 51761 0.09% 0.07% 
Korea, 
Republic of 1072120 1.77% 1.37% Iraq 37070.8 0.06% 0.05% 
Nigeria 749017.4 1.24% 0.96% Niger 32965.8 0.05% 0.04% 





China 724707.2 1.20% 0.93% Libya 27090.2 0.04% 0.03% 
Iran 
(Islamic 
Rep. of) 693005.6 1.15% 0.88% Nepal 21514 0.04% 0.03% 
Brazil 657698.6 1.09% 0.84% 
Turkmenis
tan 15000 0.02% 0.02% 
Cambodia 609067.6 1.01% 0.78% 
Brunei 
Darussala
m 7949.2 0.01% 0.01% 
United 
Kingdom 574740 0.95% 0.73% 
Israel and 
Palestine* 4369 0.01% 0.01% 
South 
Africa 561219.4 0.93% 0.72% Bulgaria 4313.8 0.01% 0.01% 
Angola 473281 0.78% 0.60% 
Syrian 
Arab Relic 4236.6 0.01% 0.01% 
Pakistan 471161 0.78% 0.60% Lebanon 3393.4 0.01% 0.00% 
Canada 431663.4 0.71% 0.55% 
Switzerlan
d 1861.4 0.00% 0.00% 
France 425663 0.70% 0.54% 
Afghanista
n 1860 0.00% 0.00% 
New 
Zealand 393947.6 0.65% 0.50% Singapore 877 0.00% 0.00% 
Netherlands 378443.8 0.63% 0.48% Mongolia 34.8 0.00% 0.00% 
Egypt 323025 0.53% 0.41% Bhutan 11 0.00% 0.00% 
Oman 319258.8 0.53% 0.41% 
Luxembou
rg 0 0 0 







Appendix I - Case 1: 2035 Projections of Aquaculture and Fisheries for All 
Strategically Important Countries, Sorted by Net Difference in Per Capita 






























































































% 5.37% 127.47 0.07 207158.06 5.54 -121.93 0.24% 
Denmark 733173 
1.21




% 0.50% 81.70 0.07 48999.54 9.22 -72.48 0.06% 
Oman 319258.8 
0.53
% 0.41% 62.51 0.20 9696.24 1.56 -60.95 0.01% 
Ireland 217056.2 
0.36
% 0.28% 43.96 0.04 23057.57 4.29 -39.66 0.03% 
Malaysia 1270070 
2.10









% 0.93% 30.43 -0.03 117840.27 4.93 -25.50 0.14% 
Netherlands 378443.8 
0.63
% 0.48% 22.09 0.03 11393.88 0.65 -21.44 0.01% 
Japan 2727663.8 
4.51
% 3.48% 21.57 0.00 302305.56 2.58 -18.99 0.36% 
Korea, 
Republic of 1072120 
1.77
% 1.37% 20.91 0.00 110592.91 2.18 -18.73 0.13% 
Angola 473281 
0.78










% 5.19% 12.27 0.01 267805.08 0.75 -11.52 0.32% 
Philippines 1886224.2 
3.12








% 0.72% 9.46 0.00 2165.61 0.03 -9.43 0.00% 
Mexico 1223530.2 
2.02
% 1.56% 9.49 -0.03 45521.60 0.31 -9.18 0.05% 
Cameroon 208199.2 
0.34




% 0.73% 8.47 -0.01 142067.79 1.99 -6.48 0.17% 
France 425663 
0.70
% 0.54% 6.52 -0.02 27598.39 0.41 -6.11 0.03% 
Yemen 148088.4 
0.25
% 0.19% 4.97 0.00 0.00 0.00 -4.97 0.00% 
Mali 94314.6 
0.16
% 0.12% 4.66 0.10 20000.66 0.65 -4.01 0.02% 
Libya 27090.2 
0.04






% 0.24% 7.26 0.12 97964.33 3.65 -3.61 0.12% 
Myanmar 2010389.6 
3.33
% 2.57% 36.95 0.04 2028436.14 33.77 -3.18 2.40% 
Nigeria 749017.4 
1.24
% 0.96% 3.63 -0.02 224830.86 0.76 -2.87 0.27% 
Germany 241910.6 
0.40
% 0.31% 2.89 -0.03 11558.14 0.14 -2.75 0.01% 
Kenya 141799.6 
0.23
% 0.18% 2.64 -0.12 1766.05 0.02 -2.61 0.00% 
Congo, 
Dem. Rep. 
of the 234742 
0.39




% 0.02% 2.49 0.11 440.60 0.06 -2.43 0.00% 
Somalia 28900 
0.05
% 0.04% 1.82 0.00 0.00 0.00 -1.82 0.00% 
Canada 431663.4 
0.71
% 0.55% 11.44 0.06 419258.15 9.93 -1.51 0.50% 
Pakistan 471161 
0.78
% 0.60% 2.13 0.01 199216.02 0.70 -1.43 0.24% 
Niger 32965.8 
0.05
% 0.04% 1.36 0.01 428.68 0.01 -1.35 0.00% 
Iraq 37070.8 
0.06




% 0.07% 1.55 0.06 44935.92 1.09 -0.46 0.05% 
Ethiopia 51761 
0.09
% 0.07% 0.45 0.10 780.96 0.00 -0.45 0.00% 
Lebanon 3393.4 
0.01






% 0.01% 0.24 -0.06 893.13 0.03 -0.21 0.00% 
Mongolia 34.8 
0.00
% 0.00% 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.00% 
Luxembour
g 0   0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00% 
Switzerland 1861.4 
0.00
% 0.00% 0.22 0.02 2329.65 0.25 0.03 0.00% 
Tunisia 93003.4 
0.15
% 0.12% 7.87 0.10 103888.07 7.94 0.07 0.12% 
Brazil 657698.6 
1.09
% 0.84% 3.09 0.02 736379.24 3.24 0.15 0.87% 
Afghanistan 1860 
0.00




% 0.01% 0.32 -0.03 17080.86 0.97 0.65 0.02% 
Singapore 877 
0.00
% 0.00% 0.15 0.02 6025.80 0.94 0.79 0.01% 
Iran 
(Islamic 
Rep. of) 693005.6 
1.15
% 0.88% 8.25 0.05 870543.67 9.08 0.83 1.03% 
Bhutan 11 
0.00
% 0.00% 0.01 0.08 776.82 0.90 0.88 0.00% 
Australia 119998.4 
0.20
% 0.15% 4.71 0.06 220959.25 7.51 2.81 0.26% 
Lao 
People's 
Dem. Rep. 67117.4 
0.11
% 0.09% 9.22 0.00 107475.81 12.46 3.24 0.13% 
Nepal 21514 
0.04
% 0.03% 0.74 0.05 141678.00 4.13 3.39 0.17% 
Turkey 297357.2 
0.49
% 0.38% 3.53 0.05 703272.97 7.66 4.13 0.83% 
Indonesia 5848617.2 
9.68
% 7.47% 21.38 0.04 8042491.75 25.96 4.58 9.51% 
Colombia 78892 
0.13
% 0.10% 1.55 0.06 343046.46 6.29 4.74 0.41% 
Bulgaria 4313.8 
0.01
% 0.01% 0.62 0.07 47130.50 7.67 7.05 0.06% 
India 4328300.6 
7.16
% 5.53% 3.14 0.06 16806288.98 10.82 7.68 19.88% 
Bangladesh 1609166.6 
2.66
% 2.05% 9.77 0.04 4303211.67 23.34 13.57 5.09% 
China 10966386.4 
18.14
% 14.00% 7.62 0.02 35427350.15 24.25 16.63 41.90% 
Viet Nam 2504336.4 
4.14
% 3.20% 25.73 0.04 5425111.02 51.04 25.31 6.42% 
Egypt 323025 
0.53
% 0.41% 3.16 0.06 3896280.60 29.89 26.74 4.61% 
Cambodia 609067.6 
1.01
% 0.78% 36.43 0.10 1278288.79 64.93 28.50 1.51% 
Grand total 
- strategic 





Appendix J: Case 1: 2035 Projections of Aquaculture and Fisheries for All 
Strategically Important Countries, Sorted by Descending Percentage Shares of 
Total 2035 Aquaculture Projection for All Strategically Important Countries 
 








































































China 10966386.4 18.14% 14.00% 7.62 0.02 35427350.15 24.25 16.63 41.90% 
India 4328300.6 7.16% 5.53% 3.14 0.06 16806288.98 10.82 7.68 19.88% 
Indonesia 5848617.2 9.68% 7.47% 21.38 0.04 8042491.75 25.96 4.58 9.51% 
Viet Nam 2504336.4 4.14% 3.20% 25.73 0.04 5425111.02 51.04 25.31 6.42% 
Bangladesh 1609166.6 2.66% 2.05% 9.77 0.04 4303211.67 23.34 13.57 5.09% 
Egypt 323025 0.53% 0.41% 3.16 0.06 3896280.60 29.89 26.74 4.61% 
Myanmar 2010389.6 3.33% 2.57% 36.95 0.04 2028436.14 33.77 -3.18 2.40% 
Cambodia 609067.6 1.01% 0.78% 36.43 0.10 1278288.79 64.93 28.50 1.51% 
Iran 
(Islamic 
Rep. of) 693005.6 1.15% 0.88% 8.25 0.05 870543.67 9.08 0.83 1.03% 
Philippines 1886224.2 3.12% 2.41% 17.21 0.01 755966.17 5.81 -11.40 0.89% 
Brazil 657698.6 1.09% 0.84% 3.09 0.02 736379.24 3.24 0.15 0.87% 
Turkey 297357.2 0.49% 0.38% 3.53 0.05 703272.97 7.66 4.13 0.83% 
Canada 431663.4 0.71% 0.55% 11.44 0.06 419258.15 9.93 -1.51 0.50% 
Thailand 1319252.2 2.18% 1.68% 18.90 0.00 397603.61 5.69 -13.21 0.47% 
Colombia 78892 0.13% 0.10% 1.55 0.06 343046.46 6.29 4.74 0.41% 
Russian 
Federation 4466198.2 7.39% 5.70% 30.60 0.03 335904.52 2.38 -28.22 0.40% 
Japan 2727663.8 4.51% 3.48% 21.57 0.00 302305.56 2.58 -18.99 0.36% 
United 
States of 
America 4061766.8 6.72% 5.19% 12.27 0.01 267805.08 0.75 -11.52 0.32% 
Nigeria 749017.4 1.24% 0.96% 3.63 -0.02 224830.86 0.76 -2.87 0.27% 
Australia 119998.4 0.20% 0.15% 4.71 0.06 220959.25 7.51 2.81 0.26% 
Peru 4203101.4 6.95% 5.37% 127.47 0.07 207158.06 5.54 -121.93 0.24% 




Kingdom 574740 0.95% 0.73% 8.47 -0.01 142067.79 1.99 -6.48 0.17% 
Nepal 21514 0.04% 0.03% 0.74 0.05 141678.00 4.13 3.39 0.17% 
Taiwan 
Province of 
China 724707.2 1.20% 0.93% 30.43 -0.03 117840.27 4.93 -25.50 0.14% 
Korea, 
Republic of 1072120 1.77% 1.37% 20.91 0.00 110592.91 2.18 -18.73 0.13% 
Lao 
People's 
Dem. Rep. 67117.4 0.11% 0.09% 9.22 0.00 107475.81 12.46 3.24 0.13% 
Tunisia 93003.4 0.15% 0.12% 7.87 0.10 103888.07 7.94 0.07 0.12% 




Rep 187086 0.31% 0.24% 7.26 0.12 97964.33 3.65 -3.61 0.12% 
New 
Zealand 393947.6 0.65% 0.50% 81.70 0.07 48999.54 9.22 -72.48 0.06% 
Bulgaria 4313.8 0.01% 0.01% 0.62 0.07 47130.50 7.67 7.05 0.06% 
Mexico 1223530.2 2.02% 1.56% 9.49 -0.03 45521.60 0.31 -9.18 0.05% 
Saudi 
Arabia 54133.6 0.09% 0.07% 1.55 0.06 44935.92 1.09 -0.46 0.05% 
Denmark 733173 1.21% 0.94% 126.58 0.00 30115.32 4.95 -121.63 0.04% 
Afghanistan 1860 0.00% 0.00% 0.05 0.08 29531.84 0.56 0.51 0.03% 
France 425663 0.70% 0.54% 6.52 -0.02 27598.39 0.41 -6.11 0.03% 
Angola 473281 0.78% 0.60% 14.40 0.17 23563.09 0.45 -13.95 0.03% 
Ireland 217056.2 0.36% 0.28% 43.96 0.04 23057.57 4.29 -39.66 0.03% 
Iraq 37070.8 0.06% 0.05% 0.92 -0.01 22878.86 0.41 -0.51 0.03% 
Mali 94314.6 0.16% 0.12% 4.66 0.10 20000.66 0.65 -4.01 0.02% 
Israel and 
Palestine* 4369 0.01% 0.01% 0.32 -0.03 17080.86 0.97 0.65 0.02% 
Germany 241910.6 0.40% 0.31% 2.89 -0.03 11558.14 0.14 -2.75 0.01% 
Netherlands 378443.8 0.63% 0.48% 22.09 0.03 11393.88 0.65 -21.44 0.01% 
Oman 319258.8 0.53% 0.41% 62.51 0.20 9696.24 1.56 -60.95 0.01% 
Cameroon 208199.2 0.34% 0.27% 7.84 0.07 6867.92 0.18 -7.66 0.01% 
Singapore 877 0.00% 0.00% 0.15 0.02 6025.80 0.94 0.79 0.01% 
Congo, 
Dem. Rep. 
of the 234742 0.39% 0.30% 2.62 0.02 4522.97 0.03 -2.59 0.01% 
Brunei 
Darussalam 7949.2 0.01% 0.01% 18.19 0.14 3500.95 7.26 -10.93 0.00% 
Switzerland 1861.4 0.00% 0.00% 0.22 0.02 2329.65 0.25 0.03 0.00% 
South 
Africa 561219.4 0.93% 0.72% 9.46 0.00 2165.61 0.03 -9.43 0.00% 




Republic 4236.6 0.01% 0.01% 0.24 -0.06 893.13 0.03 -0.21 0.00% 
Ethiopia 51761 0.09% 0.07% 0.45 0.10 780.96 0.00 -0.45 0.00% 
Bhutan 11 0.00% 0.00% 0.01 0.08 776.82 0.90 0.88 0.00% 
Lebanon 3393.4 0.01% 0.00% 0.50 -0.02 727.10 0.12 -0.38 0.00% 
Turkmenista
n 15000 0.02% 0.02% 2.49 0.11 440.60 0.06 -2.43 0.00% 
Niger 32965.8 0.05% 0.04% 1.36 0.01 428.68 0.01 -1.35 0.00% 
Libya 27090.2 0.04% 0.03% 3.94 0.00 10.00 0.00 -3.94 0.00% 
Luxembour
g 0   0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00% 
Mongolia 34.8 0.00% 0.00% 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.00% 
Somalia 28900 0.05% 0.04% 1.82 0.00 0.00 0.00 -1.82 0.00% 
Yemen 148088.4 0.25% 0.19% 4.97 0.00 0.00 0.00 -4.97 0.00% 
Grand total 
- strategic 




Appendix K - Case 2 Analysis Results 
 
 
Case 2: all US investment in FtF countries strategically important to either, US, China, or Both (Bangladesh, Ethiopia, 











































































to each, 2035 
population) 
Difference in per capita 
between shared 
investment and no 
investment 
Mali 4.66 0.65 200000.66 6.49 5.84 45714.95 1.48 0.83 
Nepal 0.74 4.13 321678.00 9.38 5.25 167392.28 4.88 0.75 
Niger 1.36 0.01 180428.68 4.36 4.35 26142.97 0.63 0.62 
Kenya 2.64 0.02 181766.05 2.49 2.46 27480.33 0.38 0.35 
Ethiopia 0.45 0.00 180780.96 1.13 1.12 26495.25 0.17 0.16 
Banglades
h 9.77 23.34 4483211.67 24.32 0.98 4328925.96 23.48 0.14 




































































































Difference in per 
capita between 
shared investment 
and no investment 
Taiwan Province 
of China -25.50 0.14% 
297840.
27 12.46 7.53 129840.27 5.43 0.50 
Korea, Dem. 
People's Rep -3.61 0.12% 
277964.
33 10.36 6.71 109964.33 4.10 0.45 
Malaysia -36.52 0.12% 
282269.
02 7.51 4.79 114269.02 3.04 0.32 
Korea, Republic 
of -18.73 0.13% 
290592.
91 5.73 3.55 122592.91 2.42 0.24 
Myanmar -3.18 2.40% 
220843
6.14 36.77 3.00 2040436.14 33.97 0.20 
South Africa -9.43 0.00% 
182165.
61 2.65 2.62 14165.61 0.21 0.17 
Thailand -13.21 0.47% 
577603.
61 8.26 2.58 409603.61 5.86 0.17 
United Kingdom -6.48 0.17% 
322067.
79 4.50 2.52 154067.79 2.15 0.17 
Iran (Islamic 
Rep. of) 0.83 1.03% 
105054
3.67 10.96 1.88 882543.67 9.21 0.13 
Viet Nam 25.31 6.42% 
560511
1.02 52.73 1.69 5437111.02 51.15 0.11 
Japan -18.99 0.36% 
482305.
56 4.12 1.54 314305.56 2.68 0.10 
Philippines -11.40 0.89% 
935966.
17 7.20 1.38 767966.17 5.91 0.09 
Russian 
Federation -28.22 0.40% 
515904.
52 3.66 1.28 347904.52 2.47 0.09 
Bangladesh 13.57 5.09% 
448321
1.67 24.32 0.98 4315211.67 23.40 0.07 
Indonesia 4.58 9.51% 
822249
1.75 26.54 0.58 8054491.75 26.00 0.04 
         
United States of 
America -11.52 0.32%       
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